

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 15731 01 OF 03 311551Z

45

ACTION EUR-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 PM-03 SPC-01 L-02 NSC-10 NSCE-00

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 DODE-00 ACDA-10 OMB-01

TRSE-00 EB-03 PRS-01 DRC-01 NEA-06 SAJ-01 AEC-05 /080 W

----- 125557

R 311413Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8419

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

USMISSION BERLIN

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 15731

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GW, US

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY STOESEL'S CONVERSATION  
WITH CDU PARLIAMENTARY FLOOR LEADER CARSTENS

SUMMARY: MR. STOESEL MET WITH CARSTENS OCTOBER 3 FOR  
DISCUSSION WHICH RANGED OVER A VARIETY OF ISSUES IN  
US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS AND IN WHICH CARSTENS PRESENTED  
CURRENT CDU THINKING ON A NUMBER OF FOREIGN POLICY  
MATTERS. CARSTENS WAS CRITICAL OF THE BRANDT GOVERNMENT  
FOR ITS HANDLING OF RELATIONS WITH THE US DURING THE  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 15731 01 OF 03 311551Z

MIDDLE-EAST CRISIS AND ON SEVERAL OTHER POINTS, BUT HIS

CRITICISM WAS MODERATE AND GENERALLY CONSTRUCTIVE. HE WAS CONCERNED OVER THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE SECOND (EUROPEAN REDUCTION) PHASE OF MBFR AND SAW A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THAT AND NEUTRALIST TENDENCIES AMONG SOME MEMBERS OF THE SPD. HE OUTLINED CDU CONCERNS OVER THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF NPT ON THE NUCLEAR COMPONENT OF FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION, STATING THAT HIS PARTY BASICALLY FAVORS THIS TREATY BUT WANTS FULL CLARIFICATION OF THE "EUROPEAN OPTION."  
END SUMMARY.

1. US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. CARSTENS OPENED BY SAYING THAT HE HAD MUCH REGRETTED THE DIFFERENCES THAT HAD ARISEN WITH THE US AS A RESULT OF THE FRG'S ATTITUDE ON THE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE BELIEVED THAT THE US HAD PLAYED A VERY IMPORTANT AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN PRESERVING THE PEACE AT A TIME WHEN PEACE WAS REALLY ENDANGERED. THE FRG HAD AN OBLIGATION, NOT JUST AS AN ALLY BUT AS A MATTER OF FAIRNESS, TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT ROLE. HE WAS SORRY THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD NOT DONE SO. HE NOTED THAT THE BRANDT GOVERNMENT, IN DEFENDING ITS NEUTRALIST POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE EAST, TENDED TO SPEAK OF THE US AND THE USSR IN MUCH THE SAME TERMS. HE THOUGHT IT UNNECESSARY FOR THE FRG TO GO THIS FAR IN ESTABLISHING ITS NEUTRALISM.

2. WEAPONS DELIVERIES, CARSTENS SAID, WERE INDEED A DELICATE ISSUE. WHAT HE PARTICULARLY CRITICIZED IN THIS CONNECTION WAS THE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THE US-FRG DISAGREEMENT. IN THE PAST, OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAD BEEN ABLE TO TALK ABOUT DELICATE MATTERS ON WHICH WE DID NOT ENTIRELY AGREE WITHOUT IMMEDIATELY CARRYING THE DISPUTE TO THE PRESS. CARSTENS THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS BROAD SYMPATHY AMONG THE FRG POPULATION FOR THE US VIEW-POINT. THERE WAS ALSO STRONG POPULAR SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. HOWEVER, CARSTENS FELT THAT ISRAEL HAD MADE SOME MISTAKES AND MISSED A NUMBER OF CHANCES FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION. IF HE WERE FOREIGN MINISTER, HE WOULD AVOID A STRONG STAND FAVORING ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER IN THE  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 15731 01 OF 03 311551Z

MID-EAST.

3. STOESSEL SAID THE US WAS ABOVE ALL CONCERNED OVER SOVIET ACTIONS AND WISHED TO AVOID AN IMBALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH WOULD BRING WITH IT MASSIVE SOVIET INFLUENCE AND A RADICALIZATION OF THE WHOLE AREA. IN ANY EVENT, IT WAS TIME NOW FOR THE US AND THE EUROPEANS TO CLOSE RANKS AND OVERCOME THEIR DIFFERENCES. CARSTENS

THOUGHT THAT THE CURRENT DISPUTE WOULD NOT HAVE A VERY  
LASTING EFFECT.

4. NEUTRALISM IN THE FRG. CARSTENS OBSERVED THAT A  
POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WHICH APPEARED DESIGNED  
TO EMPHASIZE ITS NEUTRALITY, NOT ONLY AS BETWEEN ISRAEL  
AND THE ARABS BUT ALSO AS BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR,  
INEVITABLY RECALLED TO PEOPLE'S MINDS THE NOTION OF A  
NEUTRAL POSITION FOR THE FRG IN THE CENTER OF EUROPE.  
HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A RATHER STRONG GROUP IN THE SPD

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 15731 02 OF 03 311431Z

45

ACTION EUR-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 PM-03 SPC-01 L-02 NSC-10 NSCE-00

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 DODE-00 ACDA-10 OMB-01

TRSE-00 EB-03 PRS-01 DRC-01 NEA-06 SAJ-01 AEC-05 /080 W

----- 124771

R 311413Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8420

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

USMISSION BERLIN

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 15731

LIMDIS

WHICH FAVORED SUCH A NEUTRALIST COURSE AND HE WAS CONVINCED THAT BAHR BELONGED TO THIS GROUP ALTHOUGH, HE ADDED, HE HAD NEVER ASSOCIATED BRANDT WITH IT. THERE WERE TWO REASONS UNDERLYING THE THINKING OF THIS GROUP. ONE WAS THAT US WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE IS, SOONER OR LATER, INEVITABLE. THE OTHER WAS THAT IT MIGHT EVENTUALLY BRING THE TWO GERMAN STATES CLOSER TOGETHER. CARSTENS REGARDED THIS KIND OF ARGUMENTATION AS NONSENSE AND REMAINED CONVINCED THAT A MAJORITY OF THE SPD SUPPORTED WESTERN ALLIANCE POLICY; NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS A DANGER WHICH SHOULD NOT BE LOST SIGHT OF. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 15731 02 OF 03 311431Z

5. MBFR. THE NEUTRALIST THREAT CONCERNED HIM PARTICULARLY IN CONNECTION WITH MBFR, CARSTENS SAID. HE WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT THE FIRST PHASE OF US AND USSR TROOP REDUCTIONS, ALTHOUGH EVEN THAT DID NOT MAKE HIM VERY HAPPY. BUT PHASE TWO, THE EUROPEAN PHASE, IN WHICH REDUCTIONS IN THE GDR, POLAND AND THE CSSR WOULD BE MATCHED BY REDUCTIONS IN THE FRG, THE BENELUX COUNTRIES, AND DENMARK, DID PROMOTE THE FEAR THAT A CENTRAL EUROPEAN SECURITY ZONE MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED WHICH WOULD HAVE STRONG POLITICAL OVERTONES VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH THE THINKING OF THE NEUTRALISTS IN THE FRG. WE SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS DANGER AND WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THE RISK THAT THIS PHASE OF MBFR, INVOLVING THE FRG BUT NOT ENGLAND OR FRANCE, COULD WORK AGAINST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE MILITARY FIELD. IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO AVOID CREATING A CENTRAL EUROPEAN ZONE WITH LINKS AMONG THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES TENDING TO CUT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS OFF FROM THEIR WESTERN NEIGHBORS.

6. US-EC RELATIONS. STOESSEL BRIEFED CARSTENS ON THE PROGRESS THAT HAD BEEN MADE IN NEGOTIATION OF US-EUROPEAN DECLARATIONS, NOTING THAT THERE IS STILL NO FULL AGREEMENT EITHER ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OR ON THE PROTOCOLARY ASPECTS OF THEIR SIGNATURE AT THE TIME OF A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT. CARSTENS WAS INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHETHER THE LIMITATION OF DISCUSSIONS OF OTHER THAN MILITARY/SECURITY RELATIONS TO THE US AND THE EC NINE CAUSED PROBLEMS FOR THOSE NATO MEMBERS WHO WERE LEFT OUT. (STOESSEL CONFIRMED THAT TO SOME EXTENT IT DID.) WITH REGARD TO PROTOCOLARY MATTERS, STOESSEL SAID ONE POSSIBILITY FOR SIGNATURE OF NATO DECLARATION MIGHT BE A HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING HELD IN PARIS AT POMPIDOU'S INVITATION. CARSTENS AGREED AND SAID HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO A MEETING IN

PARIS. HE FELT ONE OUGHT TO BE PREPARED TO SO SOME WAY  
TOWARD ACCOMMODATING THE FRENCH, BOTH BECAUSE FRENCH  
COOPERATION ON SUBSTANCE WAS OF IMPORTANCE AND ALSO  
BECAUSE PRESIDENT POMPIDOU DID OCCUPY A DIFFERENT  
POSITION FROM THE PRIME MINISTERS OF THE OTHER EC  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 15731 02 OF 03 311431Z

COUNTRIES.

7. EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION. STOESEL ASKED HOW  
CARSTENS VIEWED THE PROSPECTS FOR GREATER EUROPEAN  
COOPERATION IN DEFENSE MATTERS. CARSTENS SAID HE HOPED  
IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DO SOMETHING IN THIS FIELD, WHICH  
WAS A VITAL ASPECT OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS.  
AS A BEGINNING, IT WOULD MAKE SENSE TO ATTEMPT TO  
ACHIEVE GREATER STANDARDIZATION OF TRAINING AND  
EQUIPMENT AS WELL AS GREATER RATIONALIZATION OF ROLES.  
CARSTENS COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON THE BUNDESWEHR, SAYING  
THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS STILL AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY FORCE  
BUT THAT IT CONTINUED TO SUFFER FROM A LACK OF BROAD  
POPULAR SUPPORT.

8. NPT. A UNIFIED EUROPEAN DEFENSE POLICY, CARSTENS  
SAID, RAISED THE PROBLEM OF NPT. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE  
TO IMAGINE A EUROPEAN DEFENSE FORCE WHICH DID NOT HAVE  
SOME KIND OF NUCLEAR COMPONENT. IN THE PROCESS OF  
RATIFYING THE NPT (CARSTENS EXPECTED THE FIRST READING  
OF THE TREATY IN THE BUNDESTAG TO BE IN EARLY NOVEMBER  
AND THE SECOND AND THIRD READINGS PERHAPS IN FEBRUARY  
1974), THE CDU WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH THE  
PROBLEM OF A EUROPEAN OPTION. CARSTENS EMPHASIZED THAT  
HIS PARTY WAS NOT OPPOSED TO THE TREATY BUT THAT IT  
WANTED TO MAKE SURE THE NPT WOULD NOT RULE OUT FUTURE  
EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR DEFENSE.  
HE POINTED OUT THAT HIS PARTY HAD THE MEANS TO BLOCK  
NPT SINCE THE EURATOM/IAEA VERIFICATION AGREEMENT, A  
NECESSARY ASPECT OF NPT RATIFICATION, REQUIRED THE  
APPROVAL OF THE BUNDESRAT, IN WHICH THE CDU/CSU HAD A  
MAJORITY. HE DID NOT WANT TO USE THIS POWER IN FACT,

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 15731 03 OF 03 311439Z

45

ACTION EUR-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 PM-03 SPC-01 L-02 NSC-10 NSCE-00

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 DODE-00 ACDA-10 OMB-01

TRSE-00 EB-03 PRS-01 DRC-01 NEA-06 SAJ-01 AEC-05 /080 W

----- 124880

R 311413Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8421

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

USMISSION BERLIN

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 15731

LIMDIS

BUT HE SAID THAT THE CDU DID INTEND TO USE THIS CONSIDERATION IN SEEKING TO PERSUADE THE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE CLEAR IN SOME WAY IN CONNECTION WITH RATIFICATION THAT IT DOES NOT REGARD THE TREATY AS BLOCKING THE EUROPEAN OPTION. STOESSEL NOTED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND EMBASSY BONN HAD BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH GOVERNMENT AND CDU REPRESENTATIVES IN AN EFFORT TO PROVIDE CLARIFICATION. AS HE SAW IT, STOESSEL SAID, EVENTUAL EUROPEAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION WOULD PRESUPPOSE SOME KIND OF EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY. CARSTENS AGREED.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 15731 03 OF 03 311439Z

9. IN COMMENTING ON A EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE, CARSTENS EMPHASIZED THAT IT SHOULD HAVE PURELY DEFENSIVE CHARACTER, ADDING THAT HE HAD VIEWED MLF IN THE SAME

WAY AT THE TIME IT WAS BEING DISCUSSED. HE ADMITTED SOMEWHAT RUEFULLY THAT PURELY DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS DID NOT PRESENTLY EXIST AND WOULD BE IMMENSELY EXPENSIVE TO DEVELOP.

10. FRG-USSR RELATIONS AND BERLIN ISSUE. COMMENTING ON FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL'S TRIP TO MOSCOW (OCTOBER 31 TO NOVEMBER 4) CARSTENS PRAISED THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S STAND ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BERLIN AGREEMENT, COMPARING IT FAVORABLY WITH (SPD PARLIAMENTARY GROUP LEADER) WEHNER'S CRITICISM OF HIS OWN PARTY DURING THE RECENT VISIT OF A BUNDESTAG DELEGATION TO THE USSR. STOESEL POINTED OUT THAT THE NARROW SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF THE FRG'S RIGHT TO REPRESENT WEST BERLIN IN CONSULAR MATTERS DID NOT ACCORD WITH THE US INTERPRETATION. CARSTENS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE FRG SHOULD HAVE OBTAINED FULL CLARIFICATION OF THIS ISSUE IN THE COURSE OF ITS BASIC TREATY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GDR. THE GDR HAD HAD A STRONG INTEREST IN THE BENEFITS--UN ENTRY AND WORLD-WIDE RECOGNITION--TO BE DERIVED FROM THE BASIC TREATY AND THAT INTEREST WOULD HAVE PROVIDED THE LEVERAGE THE FRG NEEDED TO GET A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ON WEST BERLIN. MOREOVER, IF THE GDR HAD ENTERED INTO SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING, OTHER EE'S LIKE THE CSSR AND BULGARIA COULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO GO ALONG. HOWEVER, CARSTENS SAID (NOTING THAT HE WAS HIMSELF SPEAKING AS A POLITICIAN) HE FELT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD RUSHED THE TREATY THROUGH SO AS TO HAVE IT COMPLETED IN TIME FOR THE (NOVEMBER 18, 1972) ELECTION.

11. STOESEL OUTLINED BRIEFLY THE DELIBERATE PACE OF US MOVES TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH THE GDR. CARSTENS SAID HE THOUGHT THE US APPROACH WAS JUST RIGHT AND VERY HELPFUL. CARSTENS SAID IT WAS HARD TO SEE WHAT BENEFITS A WESTERN COUNTRY COULD DERIVE FROM RAPID ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE GDR.

12. CARSTENS WAS MILDLY CRITICAL OF WHAT HE CALLED THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 15731 03 OF 03 311439Z

"STRONG SUPPORT" THE US HAD GIVEN TO BRANDT'S EASTERN POLICY. STOESEL POINTED OUT THAT OSTPOLITIK WAS NOT ENTIRELY ORIGINAL WITH BRANDT BUT THAT SOME INITIATIVES HAD BEGUN UNDER THE GRAND COALITION AND EVEN BEFORE. CARSTENS AGREED BUT SAID THAT BRANDT USUALLY REPRESENTED THE EASTERN POLICY AS HIS OWN, AND, DEFENDING IT, HAD THE HABIT OF POINTING OUT THAT THE POLICY HAD SUPPORT OF THE US AND OTHER WESTERN ALLIES OF THE FRG. MOREOVER, CDU LEADERS, IN THEIR VISITS TO WASHINGTON, HAD FOUND VERY LITTLE ENCOURAGEMENT FOR ANY CRITICISM OF THE

BRANDT POLICY.

13. CARSTENS COMMENTED IN CONCLUSION THAT HE WAS NO LONGER TRAVELING AS MUCH AS HE HAD ONCE DONE AND THAT HE WAS NOW CONCENTRATING MORE ON DOMESTIC MATTERS THAN ON FOREIGN POLICY. HE HOPED THAT HE COULD CONTINUE TO MANAGE AT LEAST ONE TRIP A YEAR TO THE US.  
HILLENBRAND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN



## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 31 OCT 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** garlanwa  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973BONN15731  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS HILLENBRAND  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** BONN  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t1973103/aaaaabzr.tel  
**Line Count:** 393  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 8  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** garlanwa  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 02 AUG 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <02-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <21-Sep-2001 by garlanwa>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** ASSISTANT SECRETARY STOESEL'S CONVERSATION WITH CDU PARLIAMENTARY FLOOR LEADER CARSTENS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, GE, US  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005